Deniz Gulay
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The European Union is, first and foremost, the representation of a political vision. Through the E.U.’s many institutions and bodies that link its member states, it aims to make conflict not only unachievable as an act, but also economically illogical.

To accomplish its goal of preventing war, the E.U. has built its foundations on the idea that economically linked nations cannot justify pursuing military action. For instance, using the Euro as a common currency, policies of free movement within the Schengen area and a common political forum in the form of the European Parliament were developed to link European economies and make warfare to obtain resources unnecessary. This is the E.U.’s founding thesis: more economic integration can and should lead to sustainable peace.

The antithesis of the E.U.’s founding thesis is Euroscepticism, a nationalist outlook that views the E.U. as a bloated, authoritarian institution that encroaches on the sovereignty of its member states. From a Eurosceptic perspective, economic integration is merely an excuse for the assimilation of less powerful states into a system that turns them into colonies for the benefit of more powerful states.

Ideally, under a common political and economic architecture like the E.U., Germany or the Netherlands should be on equal footing with Bulgaria or Montenegro in personal income, infrastructure and fiscal stability. But, in practice, newer E.U. member states are far outpaced by the major members in economic and industrial matters. The imbalance between the economies of member states and their respective governments’ management is the root cause of crises like the 2008 shock in Greece.

In the face of these disparities, one argument that has emerged over the last couple of decades is a “two-speed E.U.,” a supposed synthesis of idealist federalism and opposing Eurosceptic nationalism that would divide the E.U. into different zones with varying levels of integration. Essentially, the two-speed idea proposes separating Europe into two entities: one zone for the established, powerful economies of Western Europe, and another for the less developed economies of Southern and Eastern Europe.

Such a synthesis, regardless of its intentions, is inherently hypocritical and threatens to do more harm than good to the E.U.’s long-term integrity. While dividing the union into zones of development intends to maintain financial stability, it misses the point of a union entirely. This is because, at a fundamental level, the two-speed concept is based on differences in economic development across member states.

The E.U. today is far more than an economic agreement or a free-trade zone. It is a social institution to which member states adhere by agreeing to its unifying liberal principles. Dividing it into zones removes economic centralization from the equation, which is the driving force behind the wealth that the E.U. generates in the first place.

Hypothetically, establishing different regional administrations may exacerbate the ongoing discord between the main E.U. institutions in Brussels and member states, which are disillusioned with E.U. ideals. For countries like Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, the prospect of being relegated to a separate zone without France, Italy or Germany may create the impression that they are not equal partners but peripheral territories.

Regardless of E.U. policymakers’ intentions, the ongoing rise of populist rhetoric in Europe may only further popularize the idea of leaving the E.U. among these member states if they are forced into these zones.

On a more philosophical level, dividing the E.U. into zones based on development contradicts the vision that first created the E.U. Policies like open borders, a common currency and a common parliament are meant to bring nations together and harmonize European economies under a single, contiguous architecture.

Creating further divisions could justify actions similar to Brexit at crucial moments of impasse between Brussels and member states. Additionally, it could justify people living in larger states, like Germany or France, against investing in places such as the Balkans or the Baltics, pushing for money to be spent solely on domestic interests instead. Instances like these would only further weaken the E.U.

It is no secret that E.U. member states are not equal. Financially, politically and culturally, the E.U. comprises nations that are not fully integrated. However, dividing the E.U. into separate zones of integration would turn these differences into hard divisions and further fuel disillusionment with Brussels, under the impression that big E.U. players don’t care about minor members.

The European Union must remain what it says in its name — a union. A loose confederation of trade zones held together by institutions too weak to enforce their policies will worsen existing divisions. Politicians, both serving the E.U. and representing their home countries, must instead work to create common, collaborative development programs to accelerate the economic growth of newer member states. Their integration into the common economic system of Europe will be the proof the E.U. needs to justify its existence as an organization for mutual welfare among nations.

Deniz Gulay is a junior double-majoring in history and Russian.

Views expressed in the opinions pages represent the opinions of the columnists. The only piece that represents the view of the Pipe Dream Editorial Board is the staff editorial.