A defining characteristic of President Trump’s second term so far has been the Greenland crisis. In the past, I’ve addressed both the pragmatic and ideological issues arising from the dispute over Greenland. Those columns primarily focused on the U.S. perspective.

However, it is also important to look across the Atlantic and consider the implications this dispute may have for Europe. Notably, the events of the Greenland crisis expose long-standing issues in European militaries, including arms production, military command and combat logistics — elements of a capable military force that can only be achieved through consolidation.

The European Union, as a coalition of countries on the continent, is highly evolving in its purpose. First an economic union, the European Union now more broadly symbolizes a political identity in which countries pledge to assist one another for mutual security. The purpose of the European Union for its members has become increasingly significant since Trump’s first term nearly a decade ago, when European leaders openly theorized about reducing ties with the United States and NATO to create a new, independent security bloc.

The crucial point to consider here is that, rather than an abstract and philosophical debate, the emergence of the European Union as a military force sovereign from the United States is increasingly necessary in Europe’s political circles as a direct response to recent political developments.

The main shortcoming of the European Union’s ambitions for sovereignty is its lack of unity, arguably its most severe weakness. The European Union is first and foremost an economic bloc designed for policymaking through debate. It isn’t cut from the same cloth as an organized, centralized structure with a strict chain of command. Coordination between member states, from individual battalions to army groups, is necessary to establish and maintain order, unless a motley crew of units breaks apart in combat by miscommunication or rivalry.

The role of the European Union was most dramatically impacted by the war in Ukraine, when mutual assistance became important not just for economic purposes but also necessary during a geopolitical crisis. The military support Ukraine receives today is made possible in large part by the consistent and coordinated effort to transfer stockpiles from the European Union to the front. With little domestic production, Ukraine is heavily dependent on Western supplies, which is why this disparity directly affects the course of the conflict.

As I argued in my previous column on Atlanticism, a geopolitical “divorce” between Europe and the United States appears increasingly likely. In this scenario, without the benefits of a unified command architecture like NATO, the European Union will bear the responsibility of defending the entire continent of Europe against all external threats.

However, European Union member states are still too far from realizing this goal, which is precisely the weakness exposed by the Greenland crisis. The inability to mount a sizable defense force over Greenland and the expected shortcomings in a hypothetical combat scenario reveal an uncoordinated and ill-prepared coalition unfit for protracted warfare.

The first important aspect of consolidating European military power is mobilization, which is the ability to transfer, deploy and coordinate units. During the dispute, when President Trump threatened military action, E.U. member states responded by sending their own troops to Greenland for support. However, these troops were a small token force, far from being a credible form of defense.

The current focus on providing arms to Ukraine, coupled with longstanding issues in arms production, means that European countries are not ready to deploy their forces in large numbers quickly. If left unchecked, this strategic weakness may leave Europe unprepared for combat.

The other, more important issue is Europe’s military industry, which is also in dire need of reform and expansion. Largely supplied by the United States through NATO, European military inventories are weakened by their dependence on U.S. equipment. Europe’s own defense industries are smaller and untested in wartime conditions. Their ability to supply large numbers of troops in a continental theater is, at best, doubtful.

In the case of Greenland, deploying larger battalions and divisions would require supply chains protected by naval escorts, robust air defense and a coordinated intelligence network. All such measures require a streamlined and unified industrial base to support them logistically, which the European Union is currently not up to the task of providing.

Leaders and representatives in Europe who support a European Union army must address these strategic weaknesses rapidly. The odds of a war between the European Union and the United States or between the European Union and Russia, remain low, but preparation as a means of deterrence is paramount.

In the words of Theodore Roosevelt, “speak softly and carry a big stick.” This is the reality for a bloc with ambitions to establish itself as a sovereign power. For this purpose, the European Union’s top priority must be to establish paths for greater coordination of its industries and a centralization of its militaries to create a unified defense structure.

Deniz Gulay is a junior double-majoring in history and Russian.

Views expressed in the opinions pages represent the opinions of the columnists. The only piece that represents the view of the Pipe Dream Editorial Board is the staff editorial.