It’s anyone’s guess what will happen overnight, but right now, the situation in Israel is this: The rain of rockets from Gaza falls untrammeled for its fourth week— there were at least 200 fired Thursday, including a handful at Tel Aviv. Israel has called up soldiers from the reserve to bolster its fighting force, continues its airstrikes against military infrastructure in Gaza and is moving heavy artillery and troops to the border of the Hamas-controlled territory.
The conflagration of tensions between the two states is the culmination of weeks of sparring between the two. The timing of the escalation, and the rising specter of an all-out ground invasion of Gaza, could be the prelude to a region-wide war.
The US and its allies must act, and act now, to de-escalate the conflict; continued violence will push the beleaguered Middle East closer to the precipice, and intervention could manifest a new opportunity for peace.
The renewal of open conflict comes at a particularly bad time for the Middle East. The last time violence between the two escalated into war was back in 2008. Israel launched a ground invasion of Gaza, but the war fizzled out in less than a month.
This time, though, the escalation coincides with heightening instability in surrounding countries. Jordan is grappling with unprecedented protests; Arab Spring fever may finally have infected the country. The war in Israel may galvanize the Palestinian majority in Jordan, plunging that country into uncertainty. To Israel and the US, Jordan’s tacit support and behind-the-scenes cooperation have been crucial, and losing it would be disastrous.
The war in Israel could also upend Egypt’s nascent democracy: It must walk a fine line between its truce with Israel and a population largely opposed to the very existence of a Jewish state.
If Egyptian President Morsi loses his balance in guiding Egypt’s response to the conflict, his country could fall back into the cycles of authoritarianism and revolt that defined it for decades.
And, of course, there’s Syria. The regime has already shown that it’s looking for the opportunity to divert attention away from its own civil war: It had a hand in an attack in Lebanon, and would jump at the chance to use its ally Hamas to exacerbate the conflict in Israel to divert international and internal attention away from the regime’s waning power. Its closest regional ally, Iran, has similar motivations: to distract international attention away from its nuclear program and internal attention from its foundering economy.
A war in Israel could thus usher in the perfect storm: Regional instability, opportunistic regimes, and a restive population in the West Bank could turn a brief flare-up of tensions into a protracted war.
On the flip side, Israelis and Palestinians have a reason, if a slim one, for hope. A successful strategy of de-escalation by Egypt could give it great leverage in mediating negotiations between the two sides, a strength it’s lacked in the past.
Many Gazans, too, resent their government, which has done little for the economy, employment — unemployment was at 40 percent in 2010 — or otherwise improving the average Gazan’s life. And, though Hamas propaganda paints the conflict as an attempt by evil Zionists to take back Gaza, many know better and probably aren’t happy that their already ravaged state is facing greater destruction.
Hamas will thus be politically and militarily weaker coming out of the conflict. While an Arab Spring is unlikely there, it’s possible. A successful revolt could spur the creation of an entirely new, democratic Palestinian government more amenable to negotiations with Israel than Hamas has been.
The Palestinian Authority, too, is a viable partner for peace; its negotiating flexibility has been hampered, though, by its radical counterpart and its death-grip on Gaza. The collapse of Hamas could thus give the PA just what it needs.
In Israel, the conflict could swing either way: On the one hand, it could toughen sentiment against negotiations of any sort. On the other, it could make clear that, as fickle and frustrating as the PA may be, it’s the best available chance for peace. Short of the unlikely emergence of a moderate government in Gaza, the PA is the official conduit of moderate Palestinian opinion.
With the conflict teetering on the edge of war, both sides must realize that the longer the conflict wears on, the more likely the entire region will be dragged in. So too should it be clear that while painful concessions litter the path to peace, their sum is surely less than that of the escalation of an already tragic internecine conflict.